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In June 2015, the warring parties in Mali signed a peace agreement aimed at bringing stability to the troubled country.
However, in May, the country experienced Second coup Within nine months.A few weeks ago, a former rebel leader involved in the peace process was AssassinatedViolent groups, including groups associated with Al-Qaida and Islamic State (ISIS), regularly launch attacks in northern, central and eastern Mali, and their presence is spreading to the south and across the country.At the same time, France announced Drawdown Operation Bakkhan, its anti-terrorism efforts in Mali and Sahel.
As the UN Security Council plans to vote on whether to extend the UN peacekeeping operation there later this month, it is time for a reality test of the effectiveness of the current international community’s support for the country’s peace process.
Mali needs more practical help from the international community to overcome the deep-seated obstacles to achieving peace, and it needs it now.
To figure out what to do next, you should first check the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement-and what has not yet been implemented. The agreement was signed after the country’s civil war in 2012. It aims to rebuild a unified national army and decentralize political power and decision-making power, paving the way for a more stable and safer Mali. However, the process of turning the agreement into reality is deadlocked, and the prospects for implementation are fading amidst the political turmoil in Bamako.
As an official independent observer of the implementation of the peace agreement, the Carter Center has first-hand insights into why the agreement is so difficult to implement and what can actually be achieved. report.
Although the 2015 agreement is far from perfect, it has the core features necessary to address the dissatisfaction at the root of Mali’s many civil wars since independence. In principle, the signatories-including the pre- and post-coup governments, as well as the platform and the Azawad Movement Coordination Association (or CMA)-still support it. The international community, working hard to advance the agreement and pledged to support its implementation, should now concentrate on taking urgent measures to break the deadlock and prevent Mali, an important peace pillar and a potential fortress that prevents the spread of violence in the region, from being set aside.
First, the alliance of nations that contributed to the agreement should initiate a new high-level diplomatic effort with the support of senior international military advisers, and work with the government, CMA, and platforms to develop a blueprint for unifying the national military.
The army is unable to ensure the safety of northern Mali, and it is clearly unwilling to integrate CMA and platform ex-combatants in accordance with the provisions of the peace agreement, which has created a security vacuum in the north.
The armed groups excluded from the national army consolidated a new, parallel security alliance. The coalition insists that it is responding to the grim reality of the local area-the need to protect the community from violent groups and hooligans, and to create a safe space for public services. But it is also an emerging competitor of Mali’s defense and security forces, and sometimes seems reluctant to incorporate its combatants and weapons into the national army. The relationship between alliance members and violent groups also has a tortuous history.
The inclusion of armed groups in the national army is a prerequisite for sustainable peace, and the establishment of a unified national army will strengthen Mali’s ability to respond to the threats of hard-line violence and organized criminal groups. After six and a half years, it is time for all parties to agree on the structure and composition of the unified army and begin implementation.
Second, Mali’s neighboring countries are increasingly threatened by the country’s spreading violence, and should take the lead in efforts to overcome specific obstacles to the implementation of the agreement and to solve common vulnerabilities.
After the August 2020 coup and the most recent coup, African Union with Economic Community of West African States Resolutely respond and urge the restoration of civil rule. The unanimous encouragement and pressure of Mali’s neighboring countries are also necessary to help the signatories break through the long-stucked power-sharing, justice and economic development provisions of the agreement, many of which are core requirements of armed groups and remain largely unresolved Succession by governments of various countries.
Finally, Mali’s partners need to promote the signing of the agreement to explain the potential benefits of the agreement to the public and understand the citizens’ views on it. Many Malians do not trust, misunderstand or oppose the peace agreement because they did not see the results of the agreement, and political actors have largely mischaracterized it. Initial outreach work has already begun, but more is needed, including city halls, listening conferences, and broadcast events. The international community can support these efforts. With the availability of information, public concerns should be reduced and accountability should be improved.
For the peace agreement in Mali to remain viable, of course fundamental changes are needed. Mali’s international partners have long believed that they play a supporting role in the peace process, assuming that the government can take responsible corrective measures to solve the country’s problems. The recent coup has challenged this assumption and emphasized that all parties in Mali need new, centralized international support to fulfill the agreement’s promises and resolve the core issues of violence that has plagued the country since 2012.
The renewed decisive action of the international supporters of the agreement can provide the Malian parties with the support they need to move forward. If such actions are not taken, the 2015 agreement will continue to fade, and the prospects for sustainable peace in Mali and the region will gradually fade.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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