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As the U.S. and Iranian negotiators tried to restore the 2015 nuclear agreement, experts warned about how often international regulatory agencies inspect the world’s civilian nuclear facilities to ensure that weapon-grade materials are not diverted for military use.
A report (PDF formatThe Washington, DC-based non-profit organization, the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) issued a warning on Thursday) that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is using outdated benchmarks to detect the amount of redirected nuclear material needed to make nuclear fuel. A destructive explosive, comparable to bombs, was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
The benchmark in question is referred to as “bulk”-or the SQ value of fissile material. These SQ values determine how often the IAEA inspects civilian nuclear facilities to ensure that dangerous amounts of p or enriched uranium do not secretly enter the weapons program.
Part of this large two-year study is designed to assess what is needed to verify and implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the coming decades. NPEC released the report on Thursday to coincide with the latest round of talks aimed at bringing the United States back to the United States. Enter the Iran Nuclear Agreement, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA).
Henry Sokolski, executive director of NPEC, told Al Jazeera: “The report highlights an issue that the negotiators of the Iranian nuclear agreement will pay good attention to, namely, how much nuclear material is needed to make a bomb, and Whether the agreement is checked to detect the amount. There are good reasons to suspect that they are.”
The safeguard measures based on the weapon design of the Second World War in the 1970s
The IAEA’s SQ value is 8 kg of and 25 kg of highly enriched uranium-which the agency believes is sufficient to produce 10 to 20 tons of nuclear bombs. This is the range of explosive energy released by American bombs dropped on Japan.
NPEC warned in its report that these SQ values are “not only outdated, but dangerously outdated” because they were adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1977 and are based on outdated World War II weapons designs.
Sokolski said, however, these benchmarks are related to the verification of the verification agreement negotiated by the regime, including the Iran nuclear agreement with the world power that the United States unilaterally withdrawn under the leadership of former President Donald Trump in 2018. .
Sokolski said that if the International Atomic Energy Agency lowers its SQ value, “it will have to increase the frequency of its inspections”, noting that it will be expensive and facing “has been troubled by several countries that have been inspected frequently.” Like them”.
Concerns about the IAEA’s standard quality values can be traced back decades.
Thomas Cochran is a retired nuclear physicist who was the director of nuclear programs at the Natural Resources Defence Council, a non-profit organization in the United States. In 1995, he co-authored a report that stated that the SQ value of the International Atomic Energy Agency was “technically indefensible”-a conclusion based on how weapon design has evolved since World War II to expand its use. The premise is the conclusion of the explosive production and availability of nuclear weapons of fissile material. Apply the technology to non-nuclear powers in “non-confidential documents”.
At that time, Cochrane believed that the International Atomic Energy Agency should lower the SQ value of S by 8 times and lower the SQ value of highly enriched uranium a little bit-he still insisted on this view.
He told Al Jazeera: “The SQ value has passed more than 70 years.” “In the past 75 years, people have become smarter and smarter in making nuclear weapons.”
The SQ value of the IAEA’s fissile material is based on a World War II weapon design and has not changed since it was first adopted more than 40 years ago. [File: Lisi Niesner/Reuters]
When asked why the International Atomic Energy Agency has not lowered its SQ threshold in the past 40 years, Fredrik Dahl, the agency’s media director, told Al Jazeera via email: “Although the SQ value has not changed, the International Atomic Energy Agency The safeguard measures and methods adopted by the agency A comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an additional protocol (AP) (if applicable) enable it to detect the transfer of a small amount of nuclear material (that is, less than 1 SQ) in a timely manner, and pass it early Discover the risks to stop this transfer.”
But Sokolski pointed out that Iran “has not yet joined the Additional Protocol,” which allows for the provision of additional verification tools for the safeguards agreement.
He added: “But it’s worse than that.” Because the Iran nuclear deal is a prerequisite for “design and sell”, provided that it “in less than a year” will prevent the transfer of nuclear material worth of weapons.
Sokolski said: “If the agency is serious about preventing the transfer of weapons or highly enriched uranium, it must be honest about the actual use of these quantities.” “To know and truly become a monitor, the International Atomic Energy Agency must Have honest people. There is no dancing around.”
Simulate the destruction of Middle Eastern cities
In addition to re-proposing the SQ value problem, NPEC also commissioned MIT graduate student and research analyst Eva Lisowski to simulate a “relatively thick and small” 1,000-ton nuclear explosive device (the most common design of a nuclear fission weapon). ) What will happen. Detonated on the ground in five cities in the Middle East.
According to the report, this device can be manufactured with only 3 kg of or 8 kg of highly enriched uranium, which is far below the IAEA’s SQ level.
NPEC chose the Middle East Population Center as the case study because “in the past 36 months, political leaders in Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have publicly stated that their countries may acquire nuclear weapons,” Sokolski said. “This is unprecedented.”
These five cities include Cairo, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Riyadh and Dubai. They were selected because they are one of the most densely populated cities in the Middle East and are located in “countries with some of the most outstanding military power in the region. Each Countries have used it in the region in the past half a century in which there have been military conflicts.” Sokolski said.
Two simulations were performed in each city to obtain estimates of death and injury, depending on whether the majority of the population was shielded and indoors at the time of the attack, rather than outdoors and unshielded.
The model also only considers the so-called “cue” radiation and residual dust effects. It does not take into account the increased risk of cancer due to radiation exposure.
The simulation found that the destructive power of a one-ton (1-kt) nuclear bomb detonated at the height of the surface matches or exceeds the destructive power of the slaughter caused by the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan.
Estimates of outdoor “unshielded” range from 82,000 and 31,000 injured in Riyadh to 353,000 and 103,000 injured in Cairo. The number of indoor “shielded” deaths in each city ranges from 32,000 to 146,000.
Tehran’s estimate is that most of the city’s residents were outdoors at the time of the attack, and 137,000 people died and 49,000 were injured. If they were indoors, an estimated 55,000 people died and 58,000 were injured.
The death toll in Dubai is estimated to be between 153,000 and 61,000, while the death toll in Tel Aviv is between 92,000 and 42,000.
The report also delved into some test cases, which illustrate that depending on the weather conditions immediately after the attack, the number of deaths and injuries caused by nuclear radiation may increase dramatically.
[ThebombdroppedbytheUnitedStatesonNagasakiin1945wasalarger20-kilotondevicebutitwasdetonatedat1600feettomaximizeitsexplosiveeffectanddestroythebuilding[1945年，美国投掷在长崎的炸弹是一个更大的20千吨的装置，但它在1600英尺高处被引爆，以最大程度地发挥爆炸作用，摧毁建筑物。
The NPEC report aims to prove that “if you detonate 1 kg of nuclear explosives on the ground instead of at the height of the 20-carat Nagasaki bomb (that is, 1,600 feet), you can kill approximately how many people, Sokolski said. “This at least shows that the international It is good that the IAEA will reduce its large number by more than half and increase the frequency of inspections at least twice. “
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